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SUMMARY 
This paper examines the prevalence of earnings management in state-funded Italian health 
care local Trusts. The Italian setting is unique in that ‘balanced-budget’ requirements have 
been put forth by legislators. Furthermore, small negative and positive deviations from the 
balanced-budget bear different consequences. We find no evidence of manipulation when 
Trusts post small losses. However, we find the Trusts manipulate discretionary accruals, 
provisions and non-operating expenses to reduce small positive deviations from zero-profit.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
The findings shed some light on potential incentives provided by a balanced-budget regime 
and thus are important for policy-makers in informing discussions on changes in financial 
reporting requirements, which may have unintended consequences. Specifically, policy-
makers interested in mandating a ‘balanced-budget’ within the health care sector or any 
sector that offers public services, should be aware of potential manipulation of reports both 
through accruals, and, importantly, through cuts in expenses, which may ultimately affect the 
level and quality of the services provided. The results from the Italian case allows 
generalisations to be drawn for other countries seeking to implement balanced-budget plans 
in their National Health Care Systems such as the UK.  
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health care Trusts.  
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1. Introduction 
Evidence of manipulation of reported profits, commonly referred to as earnings 
management, is prevalent in the for-profit sector (e.g., Jones, 1991; Barua et al., 2006; Xu, 
2016). However, research in the non-profit sector is limited. Existing evidence from the non-
profit sector finds the zero-profit threshold to be an important benchmark creating incentives 
for earnings management (Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Jegers, 2013). This paper investigates 
the presence and sources of earnings management in the state-funded Italian local health care 
Trusts (that is, Azienda Sanitaria Locale, or ASL) during the period 2010-2013. Italy 
currently is the only country in the EU which has a 'balanced-budget' mandate at the local 
government level which spills over to the local health care system. Therefore, the Italian 
setting is interesting in that it can highlight the potential drawbacks of requiring balanced-
budgets in health care institutions.  
In the Italian health care context, the importance of balanced-budgets has been 
reiterated by legislators in 2012 (Law 243/2012), and is a constitutional requirement since 
2014.5 But even prior to this, the ASLs were expected to meet the annual budget target set by 
the regional authorities. Although the budget constraints on the Italian National Health 
Service (hereafter, NHS) have been described as “typically soft”, several measures to 
strengthen them have been taken (see Tediosi et al., 2009). Particularly since 2008, failure by 
the regional governments, which are responsible for allocating the financial resources to 
ASLs, to deliver a balanced-budget would mean that they would be placed under temporary 
compulsory administration and that they would have to increase regional fiscal rates (Tediosi 
et al., 2009). So, even though the present study does not consider, due to data constraints, the 
period when the balanced-budget rule is implemented via the Constitution, it covers a period 
that ASLs were required to produce balanced-budgets by the regional authorities they belong 
                                                 
5 The balanced-budget rule is implemented via the Constitution which means the law has a higher status than 
ordinary law. Information regarding this law can be found in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). 
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to, and the latter were aware that the balanced-budget rule was going to be enacted as a 
constitutional mandate.  
The objective of the present study is twofold; namely, to investigate the existence of 
earnings management in the ASLs’ financial statements, and to identify the extent of 
manipulation when the projected performance of the ASL is below or above the break-even.6 
Accumulating large deficits are to be avoided, as they could lead to early termination of the 
top management of the ASL. However, small deviations from the break-even might bear 
different consequences for the managers of the ASLs depending on whether a small surplus 
or deficit is projected. Against this background, we examine whether ASL managers use 
income-increasing and/or decreasing techniques, and we draw hypotheses regarding the 
differing incentives for managers when they project earnings just above or below the break-
even. Furthermore, we investigate whether ASLs engage in accrual and/or real activities 
manipulation.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Evidence of earnings management in non-profit and public health care 
organizations 
The active manipulation of income towards a predetermined target is typically termed 
‘earnings management’ in the literature, and can be achieved through the management of 
accruals and/or real accounts (e.g., Kothari et al., 2016). Ample evidence has been produced 
in the for-profit sector pointing to its occurrence around certain benchmarks and across 
different industries (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Gore et al., 2007). Particularly for 
the for-profit health care sector, Dong (2015) finds that health services providers in 43 
countries manipulate accounting accruals to avoid financial distress caused mainly by rising 
                                                 
6 The terms ‘income’ and ‘earnings’ are used interchangeably within the paper. 
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labour costs. This study also stresses the relative absence of related research for the non-
profit health care sector. 
There are, indeed, relatively limited studies on the use of earnings management 
techniques in the non-profit sector, although the bulk of evidence points to the use of 
earnings management to report small positive income (Pina et al., 2012). Particularly for the 
health care sector, evidence from the US suggests that non-profit health care providers 
manage their reported earnings to just above zero both by manipulating accruals (e.g., 
Mensah et al., 1994; Leone and Van Horn, 2005) and by real activities-based earnings 
management (e.g., Eldenburg et al., 2011). Hsu and Qu (2012), in a different context, also 
report that US hospitals engage in real activities-based manipulations to pursue their own 
goals. There is, also, evidence which suggests that US hospitals manipulate discretionary 
accruals to report higher income, but only if this income is not perceived as excessive by the 
stakeholders (Vansant, 2016).  
Prior research examining earnings management in public health care systems, 
although relatively limited, also finds evidence of pervasive earnings management. Evidence 
from the Norwegian public health care system finds that hospitals increase profits through 
manipulation of billing (Anthun et al., 2016). In addition, evidence from the UK NHS shows 
that managers use accounting discretion in accruals to report income within a range close to 
zero (Ballantine et al., 2007; Ballantine et al., 2008).  Finally, Boterenbrood (2014) finds that 
Dutch hospitals smooth their income by managing their revenues.   
Incentives for earnings management in the for-profit sector exist through 
compensation, pressure from investors, contractual agreements, and political pressures (see 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999 and Xu et al., 2007 for a review of related literature). However, 
incentives for non-profit organizations differ and include fear of penalties and fear of change 
in the management team, especially if losses occur (Ballantine et al., 2007; Leone and Van 
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Horn, 2005; Vinnari and Näsi, 2008). Other incentives include maintaining the tax-exempt 
charitable status of the organization (Wood, 2001). Furthermore, high reported earnings 
might result in lower future donations (Frank et al., 1989), and the deterioration in the 
bargaining position against other stakeholders such as employees and suppliers (Leone and 
Van Horn, 2005; Tan, 2011). It might also mean increased scrutiny from the government 
(Eldenburg et al., 2011). Perceived profit manipulation can also increase the cost of future 
debt (Bernet et al., 2008). However, many of these incentives might not be relevant in public 
non-profit organizations. 
 
2.2 The Italian context and hypotheses development 
In this paper, we seek to identify whether public ASLs engage in income-increasing 
and/or income-decreasing earnings management activities to achieve the balanced-budget 
target required by Italian regional and federal authorities. Prior research showing that 
accounting information at the Italian local government level is used to influence public 
opinion and to win political benefit, in fact, prompts for such an examination (Guarini, 2016). 
To date, research on the quality of reported earnings in the Italian non-profit health care 
sector is still in its infancy, mostly due to the limited availability of relevant accounting data 
(Lega and Vendramini, 2008). 
Distinguishing between income-increasing and/or income-decreasing earnings 
management activities is important in this stream of research given the asymmetric incentives 
that profits and losses might create for managers. While the positive incentives for managers 
to present profits are well documented, even for non-profit enterprises, there is growing 
interest in research for profit avoidance (see discussion in Vansant, 2016). The case of the 
Italian health care sector offers a unique laboratory for assessing such activities, as it is a 
health care industry funded predominately by governmental funds where managers’ losses 
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must be covered by regional government taxes, and profits can potentially reduce the amount 
of regional financing to the ASL for the following year.  
The law defining the terms of employment between regions and the manager of the 
ASL (Decree n.319/2001) dictates that their annual salary, which also includes a variable part 
in the form of a bonus, is determined both by the ASLs’ efficacy in the provision of health 
care services and its financial performance. Moreover, the legislator states that although the 
terms of employment are fixed-term (3-5 years), the employment contract is renewable. 
Finally, the law gives the manager full autonomy over the allocation of human and financial 
resources available to the ASL. The terms of the ASLs’ employment, therefore, suggest that 
they have the incentive to present economic data that would be construed desirable by the 
regional authorities, which currently require a zero-profit level of performance. In the case of 
small negative deviations from zero (i.e. small losses), we would therefore expect the 
following:    
H1:  ASLs that are just below the zero profit benchmark will use income-increasing 
accrual- and/or real activities-based earnings management to achieve that target. 
From the perspective of the ASLs’ managers, however, a marginal loss is 
compensated at the regional level by higher taxes and tighter control of health care 
expenditures. On the contrary, financial surpluses could lead to a reduction of regional 
funding for the next fiscal year. Regional criteria for the allocation of funds to ASLs although 
based on a weighted capitation system are also adjusted to reflect historical spending (Lo 
Scalzo et al., 2009). If ASLs managers’ private incentives, therefore, are not synchronized 
with those of the regional governments for delivering balanced-budgets, and their primary 
objective is to maintain their level of funding, then we would expect that ASLs managers 
would strategically manage away small positive earnings towards the zero benchmark. This 
assumption is reflected in the following hypothesis: 
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H2:  ASLs that are just above the zero profit benchmark will use income-decreasing 
accrual- and/or real activities-based earnings management to achieve that target. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Variables Examined 
In our study, we consider all Italian ASLs with available financial data for the period 
2009-2013. In recent years, the Italian legislation has been vastly modified in matters of 
transparency and public availability of information concerning the activities of public 
institutions at both the national and local levels. In particular, the Legislative Decree 
n.118/2011 (and later Decree n.33/2013) advocates transparency in the Public Administration 
and requires the publication of the ASLs’ financial statements. Furthermore, as introduced by 
the Decree n.97/2016 art.6, public institutions have the obligation to publish the information 
in a special section of their website and ensure the integrity, the completeness and the easy 
accessibility of data (Art. 9-bis comma 2; Decree 33/2014). Despite this, many ASLs do not 
report financial statements on their websites. Therefore, the main source of data collection is 
from a database, published by the Ministry of Health that contains the income statements of 
each health care local Trust between 1997 and 2013.7 The collection of required balance 
sheet data was conducted by visiting the web page of each Trust separately.  
At the time of this study, out of the total 140 ASLs only 48 reported any balance sheet 
and income statement data, with 41 ASLs reporting information relating to this 5-year period 
(27 located in the North of Italy and 14 in the South of Italy).8 We lose one year of 
observations from our sample as the variables enter our empirical estimations first-
differenced, leaving us with 159 firm-year observations.  
Since 2011 (Decree n.118/2011), all ASLs in Italy must produce their financial 
                                                 
7 Ministry of Health data can be found at: 
http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?id=1314&area=programmazioneSanitariaLea&menu=vuoto 
8 Information about the ASLs considered in our examinations is available from the authors upon request. 
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statements in adherence to national accounting standards, consistent with the EU directives 
related to the reporting of the financial performance in the Public Administration. The 
database used for data collection was set up in adherence to the 2011 accounting standards, 
while any ASL financial information on their websites were later restated in adherence to the 
Decree n.118/2011. Therefore all data from financial statements in the study are prepared 
with the same accounting standards. 
The financial statements under EU directives follow accrual accounting (Pina et al., 
2009). However, accrual accounting has been shown in the literature to provide opportunities 
for earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). In this study, we examine the extent to 
which ASLs use accruals to manage profits or losses towards the zero-profit target. We also 
examine whether ASLs use real activity revenues and expenses to reach zero-profit. 
Particularly, we focus our examination on 3 types of ASLs’ accruals and 3 types of their real 
activities, and we investigate if the managing directors of ASLs manipulate them to manage 
earnings.   
To do so, we follow the empirical specification developed by Eldenburg et al. (2011). 
This specification allows capturing systematic patterns in possible objects of real activities- 
and accruals-based earnings management when ASLs’ projected earnings undershoot or 
exceed the break-even benchmark by a specified range.  ‘Projected earnings’ is defined as the 
current year's net profit/loss before the proxy of discretionary accrual or real earnings 
management plus this proxy’s value for the previous year. ‘Projected earnings’ stands, 
therefore, for the net earnings of an ASL if the object of earnings management had the same 
value as that of the previous year.  
We derive metrics for the three types of accruals used to test for the presence of 
accruals-based earnings management in the spirit of Dechow et al. (1995) with the 
modifications proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). Particularly, we use proxies for the 
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discretionary level of total accruals (DAC) and of the current accruals (DCAC). These metrics 
stand for the level of annual total and current accruals (excluding depreciation and 
amortization) that are not in line with expectations, and thus indicating that judgment is used 
in setting them. We also use the changes in the level of provisions capturing longer term 
accruals ('PROV). Contrary to accrual manipulation, real-activities manipulation means that 
managers use judgment in real operations such as delaying investments or encouraging 
revenues through offering discounts (e.g., see Roychowdhury, 2006). To test for real 
activities manipulation, we follow Eldenburg et al. (2011) by examining changes in revenues 
not related to the health care activities ('NHREV), and changes in expenses that are not 
associated with the health care of patients ('NHEXP) and the operating activities of ASLs 
('NOEXP). Table 1 reports details about the calculation of each of the above variables.   
-Table 1 somewhere here- 
Given that the level of expenditures in the ASLs is linked to budgets that are set by 
the regional government, we also consider whether any significant budgetary changes have 
occurred within the study period. In the timeframe relevant to the analysis (2010-2013), the 
total annual change has been below 1% per year. The most populated regions (e.g. Piemonte, 
Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Lazio, Campania, and Sicilia) reported 
annual variations in health care budgets between 1 and 2 percent. Smaller regions (such as 
Bolzano and Valle d’Aosta) reported an annual change larger than 4 percent (both positive 
and negative). Since no major change in the financing of health care emerges from the 
reporting of current expenditures, it can be assumed that the impact of national financing 
constraints on the performance of individual ASLs during the observation period was 
negligible.9 
                                                 
9 We do not report the data for the annual variation in the publicly financed health care expenditures for reasons 
of brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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4. Evidence of earnings management in the ASLs  
We show in Figure 1 the distribution of the realized profit figures of the ASLs. 
Particularly, we plot the realized deflated net earnings (net income divided by total assets in 
the beginning of the period) with histogram interval widths of 0.02. We find that most ASLs 
report earnings close to the zero benchmark with 104 observations falling within the range of 
-0.02 to 0.02. In our sample we have only 28 observations depicting great losses ranging 
from -0.20 to -0.04, and the vast majority of them can be found during the years 2010 and 
2011.  
-Figure 1 somewhere here- 
Although the balanced-budget mandate came into effect in 2014, it has been approved 
by the Italian lawmakers since early 2012. A casual observation of the distribution of the 
realized deflated net earnings reveals two notable differences between the period of 2010-
2011 and that of 2012-2013. First, during the latter period ASLs did not report large losses. 
Second, during the period before 2012, the ASLs most commonly reported negative, and, in 
particular, small losses. In sharp contrast, during the years 2012 and 2013 the vast majority of 
ASLs reported small profits. The evidence for the post-2012 period is in line with what is 
observed in studies from the US and UK health sector, where most hospitals report on 
average small profits (e.g., Ballantine et al., 2007; Eldenburg et al., 2011; Leone and Van 
Horn, 2005).  
We test the smoothness of the frequency distributions shown in Figure 1 using the 
standardized differences in a similar fashion to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). These are 
measured as the difference between the actual number of observations in the interval (or 
histogram bin) and the expected number of observations, divided by the estimated standard 
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deviation of the difference.10 The expected number of observations in an interval is taken to 
be equal to the average of the two adjacent intervals. The results are presented in Table 2. 
-Table 2 somewhere here- 
For the full sample (2010-2013), the standardized differences for the intervals around 
zero [-0.01,0) and [0.01,0.02) are -2.173 and -2.450, respectively (significant at the 5% and 
1% levels, respectively). Furthermore, the standardized difference for the interval including 
zero profit [0,0.01) is 4.386 (significant at the 1% level). This indicates that ASLs seem to 
shift from the intervals to the immediate left and right of zero towards the interval with zero 
profit. The same is true for the periods 2010-2011 and 2012-2013, that are shown separately 
in the second and third columns of Table 2. In both periods, however, and especially in 2012-
2013, the statistical significance of the standardized differences is higher in the interval to the 
right of zero compared to that to the left of zero, implying that shifts are more likely from 
positive earnings to close to zero earnings (rather than from negative earnings to close to zero 
earnings). 
To formally investigate the extent to which Italian ASLs employ earnings 
management techniques during the period 2010-2013, we estimate similarly to Eldenburg et 
al. (2011) the following model for each of the earnings management variables in question:  
௜,௧ܯܧ  = ܽ + ଵߚ × ௜,௧஻ܫ + ଶߚ × ௜,௧஺ܫ ଷߚ+ × ܺ௜,௧௥ + ସߚ × ௜,௧݁ݖ݅ݏ + ହߚ ×  ௜,௧݌݋݌
଺ߚ+                 × ௜,௧ݒ݈݁ + σ ଺ା௝ସ௝ୀଵߚ × ܺ௜,௧
ଶ଴଴ଽା௝ +                                                                     .௜,௧ߝ
(1)  
For ASL i in year t EM stands for the variable used to proxy the discretionary accrual 
or the real earnings management activity under examination (that is, DAC, DCAC, 'PROV, 
'NHREV, 'NHEXP, or 'NOEXP). ܫ஻(஺) is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the 
projected earnings is below (above) the zero-profit target, but lies within the range of  
                                                 
10 We use intervals of 0.01 for more specificity. Using intervals of 0.02 provide similar results. 
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[-0.04,0) ((0, 0.04]), and 0 otherwise. ܺ௥ is an indicator variable capturing regional 
characteristics and takes the value of 1 if the ASL operates in the north, and 0 if it operates in 
the south of Italy. ݁ݖ݅ݏ stands for the (log) total assets, and ݌݋݌ for the (log) of population in 
the region of an ASL (Data about the number of residents in each ASL's geographic area are 
from the Italian Ministry of Health databank in 2014). ݈݁ݒ is total liabilities divided by total 
equity. Finally, ܺଶ଴଴ଽା௝ is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for the year shown in 
the superscript, and 0 otherwise.  
We focus, therefore, on the estimates of coefficients ȕ1 and ȕ2. Statistically significant 
coefficient estimates ȕ1 and ȕ2 reveal the presence of a systematic pattern in the accrual 
metric or in the proxy for real earnings management activity, when normalized projected 
earnings falls within the [-0.04,0) or (0, 0.04] range, respectively. Particularly, a positive 
(negative) and statistically significant estimate ȕ1 for the variables DAC, DCAC and ǻNHREV 
('PROV, ǻNHEXP and ǻNOEXP), that are positively (negatively) associated with net 
earnings, would suggest that ASLs engage in income-increasing earnings management. On 
the contrary, a negative (positive) and statistically significant estimate ȕ2 for the variables 
DAC, DCAC and ǻNHREV ('PROV, ǻNHEXP and ǻNOEXP), suggests that ASLs engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management.  
We also include in Eq. (1) variables that capture the impact of other factors on the 
ASLs’ accruals and real activities. Specifically, we include the size and pop variables to 
control for the size of the ASL and of the region that they cover, as larger firms have higher 
discretionary accruals and expenses (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). We also include the variable 
lev, as firms tend to manipulate earnings when their debt levels are high and they are close to 
covenant violation (e.g., Jha, 2013). We include the year dummies to control for aggregate 
changes in relationships over time, and the ܺ௥ dummy variable to capture any systematic 
differences between the ASLs’ located in the north and in the south of the country. Finally, 
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the value of the intercept captures patterns in the earnings’ management variables when the 
projected earnings is far above or below the zero-profit target (that is, larger than +0.4 and 
smaller than -0.4).  
-Table 3 somewhere here- 
To start with the empirical estimations, we present Pearson correlation coefficients of 
all earnings management variables and other variables included in Eq. (1) in Table 3 to check 
for any issues of potential multi-collinearity. We find, as expected, a high correlation 
coefficient between the leverage and the size of the firm (coeff. = 0.765). While a high 
correlation between independent variables is commonly met in accounting research, and is 
not necessarily harmful, it should not be ignored. In the presence of harmful near 
multicollinearity the parameter estimates and their statistical significance might be sensitive 
to small changes in the regression specification. This appears not to be the case here as our 
model estimates are robust to the exclusion of the correlated variables.11      
-Table 4 somewhere here- 
We present the results from the estimation of Eq. (1) in Table 4.12 Our results do not 
support hypothesis H1, as we find no evidence that ASLs manipulate small losses towards the 
zero-profit target. Specifically, the coefficient ȕ1 is not significant in any of the equations. On 
the contrary, we find evidence to support that ASLs with projected earnings just above the 
benchmark engage in income-decreasing earnings manipulation, in line with hypothesis H2. 
Particularly, in the equations of DAC and DCAC coefficient estimates ȕ2 are negative and 
statistically significant, while in the equations of 'PROV and ǻNOEXP coefficient estimates 
ȕ2 are positive and statistically significant. This means that ASLs manage away positive 
deviations from the benchmark by systematically reporting lower discretionary total and 
                                                 
11 The results from these estimations are not included here but are available from the authors upon request.  
12 We also measure DAC and DCAC without including ROA as an independent variable, as in Leone and Van 
Horn (2005), given that performance of ASLs may not be appropriate in determining the level of accruals in 
non-profit organizations. Un-tabulated results are similar to those reported. 
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current accruals and by overstating their provisions and non-operating expenses. Previous 
evidence also finds that hospitals with above-benchmark profits do not report high gains from 
sale of property in order to avoid showing high profits (Eldenburg et al., 2011). In our study, 
however, we include property sales proceeds under the category non-Health care revenues, 
and we do not find any statistically significant results.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines for the first time the earnings management behaviour of public 
managers of local health care Trusts in Italy. In particular, we study the ASL management’s 
propensity to manage away small deviations (both negative and positive) from the break-
even. These results shed some light on the quality of reported earnings by Italian NHS Trusts, 
contributing to the growing literature which seeks to identify the prevalence of earnings 
management in the financial statements of public hospitals. Research in this area is relatively 
limited, and to the best of our knowledge there is no such research for the Italian NHS. To the 
extent that an entity’s financial statement can provide policymakers and the public with a 
view on the financial and operational performance of the hospital, it is important that this 
view is accurate not only for reasons of accountability, but also because their perceived 
quality influences the efficient allocation of future funding (Boterenbrood, 2014).  
This study bears implications for other countries considering adopting a balanced-
budget rule for their health care Trusts. For example, there have been discussions in the UK 
about the necessity of a balanced-budget regime in the National Health Care system.13 Our 
results show that in the Italian setting the requirement for balanced-budgets essentially 
creates incentives for managing earnings down. This finding can, therefore, shed some light 
on the potential incentives created by balanced-budget plans.  Furthermore, if this finding is 
                                                 
13 For example, see the arguments by Lord Kerslake, former head of the  UK civil service and DCLG permanent 
secretary, now chair of King's College Hospital, London at: 
 http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/opinion/2016/11/what-if-nhs-had-balance-its-books-local-government) 
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confirmed by further evidence from the health care systems of other countries, the outcomes 
of this study prompt for a review of the public policies pertaining to expected surpluses from 
state-owned NHS Trusts. The findings of this study could also be relevant to inform the 
implementation policies of the Fiscal Compact across the EU countries that have agreed to be 
stricter on delivering balanced-budgets.    
Our findings suggest that ASLs manage away small positive deviations from the 
break-even showing a preference for lowering financial surplus. On the contrary, we find no 
evidence of earnings management when ASLs expect to report small losses. We attribute this 
aversion to higher surpluses to ASL managers’ concerns for maintaining the level of regional 
funds intact. We find, therefore, that the quality of the financial statements is aligned with 
management’s incentives. Lo Scalzo et al. (2009) claim that the ‘overshooting’ of budgets 
has been an enduring characteristic of the Italian health care system at all levels of public 
administration. In any case, any evidence about competing incentives among the different 
levels of management in the Italian NHS could be used to inform policies aiming at 
increasing decentralization of health care services not only in Italy but also internationally.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1 
Earnings management variables 
       Variables Definition 
 ௜௧ Discretionary total accruals of ASL i in year t measured as the residuals fromܥܣܦ .1
the yearly cross-sectional regressions of the form: 
 
௜௧ݏ݈ܽݑݎܿܿܣ = ܽ + ܾ[ο(ܴ݁ݒ)௜௧ െ ο(ܴ݁ܿ)௜௧] + ௜௧ܧܲܲܿ +  ,௜௧ିଵܣܱܴ݀
 
where:  
  :௜௧ stand for the total accruals of ASL i in year t measured asݏ݈ܽݑݎܿܿܣ
ο(ܰ݊݋ െ ௜௧(ݏݐ݁ݏݏܣ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ ݄ݏܽܥ െ   ο(ܰ݊݋ െ
௜௧(ݏ݁݅ݐ݈ܾ݅݅ܽ݅ܮ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ ݐܾ݁ܦ െ  Depreciation௜௧  ; 
 
ο(ܰ݊݋ െ ௜௧(ݏݐ݁ݏݏܣ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ ݄ݏܽܥ = ο(ݕݎ݋ݐ݊݁ݒ݊ܫ)௜௧ + ο(ܴ݁ܿ)௜௧ +
ο(݁݉݋ܿ݊ܫ ݀݁ݑݎܿܿܣ)௜௧; 
 
ο(ܰ݊݋ െ ௜௧(ݏ݁݅ݐ݈ܾ݅݅ܽ݅ܮ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ ݐܾ݁ܦ = ο(Provisions)௜௧ + ο(Payables)௜௧ +
ο(ݏ݁݅ݐ݈ܾ݅݅ܽ݅ܮ ݀݁ݑݎܿܿܣ)௜௧; 
 
ο(ܴ݁ݒ)௜௧= Change in total revenues of ASL i from year t-1 to t; 
ο(ܴ݁ܿ)௜௧= Change in receivables of ASL i from year t-1 to t; 
௜௧ܧܲܲ  = Gross Property, Plant and Equipment of ASL i in year t; 
 ௜௧ିଵ= Return on assets of ASL i in year t-1 measured as earnings beforeܣܱܴ
extraordinary items over total assets. 
 
 ௜௧ Discretionary current accruals of ASL i in year t measured as the residual fromܥܣܥܦ .2
the yearly cross-sectional regressions of the form: 
 
௜௧ݏ݈ܽݑݎܿܿܣ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ = ܽ + ܾ[ο(ܴ݁ݒ)௜௧ െ ο(ܴ݁ܿ)௜௧] +  , ௜௧ିଵܣܱܴܿ
 
where ݏ݈ܽݑݎܿܿܣ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ௜௧stand for the current accruals of ASL i in year t 
measured as: 
ο(ܰ݊݋ െ ௜௧(ݏݐ݁ݏݏܣ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ ݄ݏܽܥ െ ο(ܰ݊݋ െ   ௜௧(ݏ݁݅ݐ݈ܾ݅݅ܽ݅ܮ ݐ݊݁ݎݎݑܥ ݄ݏܽܥ
 
3. 'PROVit Change in provisions of ASL i from year t-1 to year t  
4. οܰܧܴܪ ௜ܸ௧  Change in revenues from non-health care activities (other revenues such as 
interest on loans provided and increase in value of fixed assets; and revenues 
from sale of assets) of ASL i from year t-1 to year t. 
5. οܰܺܧܪ ௜ܲ௧  
 
Change in non-health care expenses of ASL i from year t-1 to year t (purchase 
of non-health care services such as cost of laundry, utilities, and insurance 
premiums + maintenance expenses + administrative salaries + other charges 
such as rental and leasing fees + depreciation, amortization and impairment 
expenses) 
6. οܱܰܺܧ ௜ܲ௧  Change in non-operating expenses of ASL i from year t-1 to year t (interest 
expense) 
Notes: This table reports the definitions of the variables and accounts used to test for the presence of earnings 
management in ASLs. 
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TABLE 2 
Standardized differences in intervals around zero-earnings 
benchmark for Net Earnings (deflated) 
Interval 
Full 
Sample 
 2010-
2011 
 2012-
2013 
  
[-0.02, 0.01) 0.435 
 
0.888 
 
0.056 
 [-0.01, 0.00) -2.173 ** -2.042 ** -1.801 * 
[0.00, 0.01) 4.386 *** 3.64 *** 3.939 *** 
[0.01, 0.02) -2.450 *** -2.308 ** -2.026 ** 
[0.02, 0.03) 0.158 
 
0.355 
 
0.000 
 */**/*** indicates statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% levels, respectively. 
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 T
A
B
L
E
 3 
Pearson C
orrelation C
oefficients (p-values) 
  
D
AC
 
D
C
AC
 
'N
H
REV 
'PRO
V 
'N
H
EXP 
'N
O
EXP 
ܺ
௥௘௚ 
 ݁ݖ݅ݏ
 ݌݋݌
 ݒ݈݁
D
AC
 
1.000 
0.959 
-0.168 
0.044 
0.120 
0.044 
0.094 
0.090 
0.095 
0.057 
 
 
(0.000) 
(0.034) 
(0.579) 
(0.132) 
(0.582) 
(0.238) 
(0.260) 
(0.235) 
(0.474) 
D
C
AC
 
 
1.000 
-0.217 
0.076 
0.153 
0.008 
0.073 
0.094 
0.070 
0.059 
 
 
 
(0.006) 
(0.339) 
(0.054) 
(0.917) 
(0.363) 
(0.240) 
(0.379) 
(0.463) 
'N
H
REV 
 
 
1.000 
0.079 
-0.105 
0.186 
0.024 
-0.031 
-0.025 
-0.023 
 
 
 
 
(0.323) 
(0.187) 
(0.019) 
(0.768) 
(0.697) 
(0.754) 
(0.777) 
'PRO
V 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.148 
0.063 
0.166 
0.068 
0.163 
0.108 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.063) 
(0.433) 
(0.037) 
(0.397) 
(0.040) 
(0.175) 
'N
H
EXP 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
-0.088 
0.010 
0.016 
0.091 
-0.045 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.271) 
(0.905) 
(0.845) 
(0.254) 
(0.574) 
'N
O
EXP 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
-0.080 
0.060 
0.012 
0.071 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.318) 
(0.454) 
(0.879) 
(0.375) 
ܺ
௥௘௚ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
-0.102 
0.351 
0.096 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.200) 
(0.000) 
(0.230) 
 ݁ݖ݅ݏ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.466 
0.765 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
 ݌݋݌
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.462 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0.000) 
N
otes: D
escription of the dependent variables can be found in Table 1, and for the independent variables in the m
ain body of the text. 
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TABLE 4 
Accrual- and Real Activities-based Earnings Management 
Panel A: Accruals and activities positively associated with Net Earnings 
 DAC t-stat DCAC t-stat 'NHREV t-stat 
 0.15- 0.014- 0.84- 0.172- 1.10- 0.176- ߙ
 ஻ -0.003 -0.33 -0.011 -1.44 0.024 0.67ܫ
 ஺ -0.054*** -3.32 -0.060** -2.69 0.014 0.48ܫ
ܺ௥௘௚ 0.025** 2.18 0.020 0.89 0.012 0.92 
 0.63- 0.005- 4.01 ***0.029 6.49 ***0.026 ݁ݖ݅ݏ
 0.90- 0.014- 0.01 0.000 0.20 0.011 ݌݋݌
 0.41 0.003 0.71- 0.014- 0.81- 0.014- ݒ݈݁
ܺଶ଴ଵ଴ 0.004 0.28 -0.027** -1.99 0.031** 2.31 
ܺଶ଴ଵଵ -0.004 -0.57 -0.034*** -3.35 0.034** 2.56 
ܺଶ଴ଵଶ -0.008 -0.48 -0.034** -2.09 0.025** 2.15 
R2 (%) 4.78% 5.73% 3.96% 
Panel B: Accruals and activities negatively associated with Net Earnings 
 'PROV t-stat 'NHEXP t-stat 'NOEXP t-stat 
 1.00- 0.014- 1.94 **0.221 6.57- ***0.045- ߙ
 ஻ 0.001 0.15 -0.039 -0.93 0.001 0.90ܫ
 ஺ 0.015** 2.43 -0.032 -0.81 0.004*** 3.82ܫ
ܺ௥௘௚ 0.006*** 6.10 -0.014 -0.32 -0.001 -0.78 
 0.03- 0.000 1.22 0.019 1.30- 0.003- ݁ݖ݅ݏ
 0.01- 0.000 2.83 ***0.064 0.96 0.010 ݌݋݌
 0.79 0.001 1.57- 0.034- 1.59 0.006 ݒ݈݁
ܺଶ଴ଵ଴ -0.004 -1.17 -0.035** -2.14 0.003*** 6.03 
ܺଶ଴ଵଵ -0.002 -0.60 -0.007 -0.32 0.004*** 6.52 
ܺଶ଴ଵଶ -0.002 -0.52 -0.051** -1.97 0.003*** 5.03 
R2 (%) 12.51% 9.74% 20.65% 
Notes: This table reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (1). Description of the 
dependent variables can be found in Table 1, and for the independent variables in the 
main body of the text. 
 */**/*** indicates statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% levels, respectively. 
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